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TORTS-DEFAMATION-CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD--The United States
Supreme Court has held that in a libel action by a private indi-
vidual against a radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a news-
cast relating to his involvement in an event of public concern, the
individual can recover only upon clear and convincing proof that
the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
A licensed radio station broadcast news stories of the arrest of
George Rosenbloom, an obscure distributor of nudist magazines, for
possession of obscene literature. The broadcasts used the terms "smut
literature racket" and "girlie-book peddler," to denote that the police
in Philadelphia had "hit" the main distributor of obscene material.
Rosenbloom was acquitted of the criminal obscenity charges because
the state court held as a matter of law the magazines were not obscene.
Subsequently, he filed a diversity action in the federal district court
for damages under Pennsylvania's libel law."
The district court held that the holding of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,2 in which a public official was unable to recover for defama-
tory falsehoods relating to his official conduct unless he proves actual
malice, could not be extended to the instant case because Rosenbloom
was neither a public official nor a public figure. Consequently, the
jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding the New York Times
standard was applicable to news broadcasts reporting "matters of public
interest."
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The
Court recognized the "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open .... 4
Rosenbloom argued that the Constitution required only that a
private individual prove that the publisher failed to exercise reason-
able care in publishing defamatory falsehoods. First, the private in-
1. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1968), rev'd, 415 F.2d
892 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969), af'd, 403 U.S. 29
(1971).
4. 376 U.S. at 270-71.
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dividual did not assume the risk of defamation by thrusting himself
into the public limelight, 5 Secondly, the private individual does not
have access to the media to rebut the falsehoods as a public figure
would have. Thus, the common law action of defamation is a private
individual's only redr'ess.
The Court held that these arguments could not be reconciled with
the purpose of the first amendment. Recognizing that when only a
few well-known figures have access to the media, and that when the
public official serves in a minor position,6 or, as in Rosenblatt v. Baer,7
when one is no longer in the limelight, the argument that public
figures and/or officials need less protection than the private individual
is without merit. The Court stated that the solution for protection of
a private individual's reputation lies in state retraction or right of reply
statutes, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public
concern.
8
The Court considered whether to apply a standard of reasonable
care and concluded that it was an "elusive standard" which does not
permit the necessary "breathing space" for the vital needs of the first
amendment. Thus, an extension of the New York Times standard was
needed to prevent self-censorship.
In the landmark New York Times case, an advertisement was placed
in the New York Times. It was an inaccurate account of civil rights
demonstations in Alabama and allegedly defamed a public official.
The Supreme Court held that a state cannot award damages to a
public official for defamatory falsehoods that relate to his official con-
duct unless he proves "actual malice"-that the statment was made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. The Court based its decision on the premise that
there is a profound commitment to debate on public issues and that
the debate should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." 9 "Breathing space"
is afforded to the press and mass media because the Court realized that
5. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
6. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (members of a local school
board); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (police officers); Lundstrom v.
Winnebago Newspaper Inc., 58 Ill. App. 2d 33, 206 N.E.2d 525 (1965) (retired mayor).
7. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
8. 403 U.S. at 47 n.15; see generally Donnelly, The Right to Reply: An Alternative to
an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REy. 867 (1948).
9. 376 U.S. at 270.
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the importance of interchanging ideas necessitates even protecting
some erroneous speech.10
In Garrison v. Louisiana,1 the Supreme Court extended the New
York Times standard to cases of criminal, as well as civil, libel when
it held that the Constitution limits state power to impose sanctions12
on individuals who criticize public officials. The Court noted that any
relevant criticism of a public official was within the New York Times
privilege, even if it reflects on the official's private character.13 Again,
the Court placed emphasis on the profound national commitment to
open debate on public issues.' 4
The public event, rather than the individual's status, was recognized
as the determinative factor in an action against the mass media for
libel in the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts5 and As-
sociated Press v. Walker.'6'In these cases, a football coach and a re-
tired Army general were held to be "public figures," as both attracted
a substantial amount of independent public interest. The Court rea-
soned that both men thrust their personalities into the "vortex" of
public matters "and each had sufficient access to the means of counter-
argument to be able 'to expose through discussion the ... fallacies' of
the defamatory statements.' ' 7
The Court's next extension of the New York Times case was in
Time, Inc. v. Hill.8 In Hill, the plaintiffs sued Life magazine for
invading their privacy. Life had published an article about a Broad-
way play which was a fictionalized account of the Hill family being
held hostage by three escaped convicts. The Court held that the
plaintiffs could not recover unless they proved actual malice. Since
the Court did not consider the status of the plaintiff, it was predictable
10. Id. at 269-72.
11. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
12. The sanction was a state law which punished false statements if made with ill-will
without regard to the New York Times standard; if ill-will was not established, a
false statement concerning public officials would be defamatory if not made in reasonable
belief of its truth under Louisiana law. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14 § 47 (1950).
13. 379 U.S. at 76-77.
14. This rationale was the impetus in the expansion of the New York Times holding
to include all public officials who have or appear to have such substantial responsibility
for control of government affairs that the employee's position invites scrutiny. Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (county supervisor of recreation area).
15. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
16. 388 U.S. 140 (1967).
17. 388 U.S. at 155. See also Greenbelt Publishing v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (well-
known real estate dealer).
18. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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that the Court would make no distinction between an action for
invasion of privacy and an action for libel.'
Meanwhile, lower federal courts expanded the New York Times stan-
dard to include any published news item in which the public has a valid
interest, irrespective of the plaintiff's status.20 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System Inc.2 1 extended the New York Times standard
because of the Supreme Court's continued emphasis on the first
amendment. The Court stressed "the right of the public to have
an interest in the matter involved, and its right therefore to know or be
informed about it."22 The rationale in United Medical was based on
the belief that the field of public health was inherently subject to public
scrutiny.
In the New York Times case the actual malice standard,2 which
required that the defendant knew the statements were false, or pub-
lished them with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not,
was of prime importance. 24 Although the Court did not clarify the
meaning of actual malice, its later decisions interpreted it harshly. In
Garrison, merely demonstrating that the utterances were motivated by
ill-will or hostility was insufficient to establish liability. Instead, the
plaintiff must prove a "high degree of awareness of their [the utter-
ances'] probable falsity." 25 Later, in St. Amant v. Thompson,26 the
Court expanded the meaning of reckless disregard and said that there
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant
19. The magazine article was published over two and one-half years after the incident.
It is suggested that a news article itself may re-activate public interest in a prior event
that was or was not newsworthy at that time. This indicates that the press may create its
own constitutional protection by its ability to determine whether an event is newsworthy.
See Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968).
Nimmer contends that invasions of privacy should be without first amendment protection
because a person's reputation can be "rehabilitated" if a libel has occurred while more
speech cannot cure an invasion of privacy.
20. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970) (accomodations at
Atlanta, Ga., during the Masters Golf Tournament); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d
920 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (organized crime); United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969)
(matters of public health); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969),
aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (crime).
21. 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
22. Id. at 710.
23. Actual malice as defined by the Supreme Court is not the traditional common law
malice that was defined as ill-will, evil motive, or intent to injure. See W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 821-22 (3d ed. 1964); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 2 (1968). See also Purcell
v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167, 191 A.2d 662 (1963).
24. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
25. 379 U.S. at 74.
26. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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had "serious doubts as to the truth of [his] publication."2 7 The Court
also held that the plaintiff must prove his case with "convincing clar-
ity."28 The Court interpreted Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis
Publishing Co. to mean that reckless conduct is not measured by the
reasonable man standard. Thus, a plaintiff's burden of proof is almost
insurmountable when a defamation action involves the mass media and
the matter is of general or public concern.2 9 Recovery is highly im-
probable.30 In reality, it would seem that the Court accepted the
absolutist view espoused by the late Justice Black in the New York
Times case.31 His concept of the first amendment does not permit
recovery of libel judgments against the mass media, even when state-
ments are broadcast with knowledge that they are false.32
It is suggested that the actual malice standard does not strike the
desired balance between the need for full discussion and debate on
public matters and the need for protection of personal reputations and
privacy against harmful falsehoods. The Court should not only balance
the individual's interest in protecting his reputation or privacy against
society's need for a free flow of information, 3 rather, it should take
into account a multitude of factors. The subject matter concerned,
status of the plaintiff, "news-gathering ability" of the mass media,
reliability of the source of information, deadlines for publication, and
notice that the material was false are additional factors which should
be considered. A one-facet test of whether the matter is of general or
public concern does not adequately balance the interests involved.
Another problem which was not considered in Rosenbloom was the
absence of the definition of what constitutes general or public interest.
The Court held the public has a vital interest in a person's arrest for
distributing obscene magazines.34 The Court noted that the issues of
27. Id. at 731.
28. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F.
Supp. 1005, 1010 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
29. See Note, Public Official and Actual Malice Standards: The Evolution of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 56 IowA L. REv. 393 (1970), for a detailed analysis of the trial stages
and what the plaintiff must prove at each stage to enable him to recover.
30. Only a few cases have allowed recovery, or summary judgment was denied on the
basis that the plaintiff was able to show actual malice. Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558
(7th Cir. 1965); Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1969); see also Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (modified form of actual malice found-highly
unreasonable).
31. 376 U.S. at 293.
32. Id.
33. See Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know; A National
Problem and a New Approach, 46 TExAs L. REv. 630 (1968).
34. 403 US. at 43.
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public interest need not be of importance or significance but only of
concern. However, it does not delineate what standard to apply nor
suggest any rules. Its only attempt to clarify this murky area was a
footnote explaining that there are some activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of public or general interest.35 State court
decisions suggest that the scope of public or general interest is broad.36
The Court suggested that the solution to providing protection for a
private individual's reputation lies in the enactment of right-of-reply
and retraction statutes.8 7 The statutes' purpose is that the person
harmed may vindicate his reputation and thus make the mass media an
open forum for conflicting viewpoints.88
A practical consideration for the acceptance of the right-of-reply stat-
utes is judicial economy. The defamed person would not have to incur
the expense and delay involved in litigation. He only would have to
submit his reply to the newspaper.39
A retraction statute would perform a service for both the defamed
individual and the truth-seeking public. If the retraction is given
proper coverage, the person is vindicated through the same medium
and the same general audience receives notice of the publisher's error.
However, a publisher's refusal to retract a statement would raise the
constitutional question of whether the mass media can be compelled to
publish a retraction without a judicial determination of the truth or
falsity of that statement.40 It is suggested that the adoption of a uniform
national system of remedies is necessary in order to avoid the burden
which would be placed on multi-state publishers by the possibility of
retraction in one state and reply in another.41
If the Court's analysis of the problem is correct, that "the public's
primary interest is in the event .... not in the participant's prior ano-
nymity or notoriety," 42 it is suggested that the source of the information
35. Id. at 44 n.12.
36. See 85 HAv. L. REv. 222, 226 (1971).
37. 403 U.S. at 47 n.15.
38. Although there has been only limited American experience with a legally enforce-
able right-to-reply, France has enforced such a law since the early 1800's. See Donnelly,
The Right to Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867, 884 (1948).
See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a (West 1941); MAss. ANN. LAwS ch. 231, § 93 (Supp. 1947).
39. Problems are created if the newspaper refuses to print a retraction but it would
seem that a properly drafted statute could obviate these problems or provide an avenue
for remedies.
40. See Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HA~v. L. REV.
1730, 1739 (1967), for other problems dealing with retraction statutes. See also 47 U.S.C.
§ 315 (1970), and the problems raised dealing with the Equal Time doctrine.
41. 80 HARV. L. REv. at 1755-56 (1967).
42. 403 US. at 43. A simple suggestion would be to delete the plaintiff's (or would be
105
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is secondary. Although Rosenbloom extended the New York Times
standard only to licensed radio stations and other mass media, a similar
standard for private individuals would appear to be required by the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. 43 If this is a valid deduc-
tion, the law of defamation is emasculated, if not destroyed.
In conclusion, the decision in Rosenbloom was predictable; however,
the Court failed to discuss three vital issues: (1) whether the actual
malice standard adequately provides relief for defamed individuals;
(2) what constitutes a public or general interest; and (3) what are the
solutions for these problems. Obviously, there is a fundamental and
important need for open dissemination of ideas and information, how-
ever, it is not reasonable to satisfy that need at the expense of an in-
dividual's reputation.44
John L. Livingston, Jr.
plaintiff's) name from the news story if the court's belief, that the public's primary
interest is in the event, is true; but somehow this has been left for editorial judgment,
not judicial determination.
43. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), where the Supreme Court held that
the liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers per se but is a personal liberty.
44. Possibly the courts will follow the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in
Matus v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971), by also narrowly
defining what constitutes a matter of general or public interest.
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